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DECONSTRUCTING AFFECT: POSTHUMANISM AND MARK HANSEN'S MEDIA THEORY 
 
Abstract: In the context of the highly contested discourse of posthumanism, this essay examines Mark Hansen’s attempt to give a robust account of technology in its 
extra-linguistic dimension by evincing an ‘"originary" coupling of the human and the technical’ that grounds experience as such (Hansen 2006a: 9). Specifically, I argue 
that Hansen’s perspective is haunted by the representational logic that it moves against. In this, I do not repudiate Hansen’s argument as such, but rather reject one of 
its central underlying implications: that the extra-discursive materiality of technology might be accessed, linguistically, without attaching a meaning to it that is foreign 
to this materiality. To this end, the essay begins with an examination of technesis as it is initially developed by Hansen, demonstrating the necessity from which it 
sprang, the contribution that Hansen’s reading makes, and its ultimate limitations. From here, the essay articulates Hansen’s argument for an affective topology of the 
senses, corroborating the increased importance of digital technologies in this perspective through a brief comparison of Roberto Lazzarini’s 'skulls' (as read by Hansen) 
and my own piece 'Sound.' Finally, this comparison pivots the essay towards a critical analysis of Hansen’s account of primary tactility that demonstrates its 
dependence on the (representational) logic of language. In closing, then, I argue that what is accomplished by Hansen’s putting-into-discourse of technesis is, 
paradoxically, a re-staging of the constitutive ambivalence of deconstruction that reinvigorates the posthumanist elements of that discourse. 
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 “The potential of deconstructive analysis lies not in the simple recognition of the inevitability of exclusions, 
but in insisting upon accountability for the particular exclusions that are enacted and in taking up the 
responsibility to perpetually contest and rework the boundaries” (Barad 1998: 104).  
Today, the signs of technological posthumanism have become so ubiquitous that most of us, on 
most occasions, have ceased to take notice. Indeed, our navigations through diverse realities and 
our negotiations with aggressive technological couplings are no longer even really remarkable: 
email and video-chats, certainly, but also medical imaging, online classes, virtual exercise 
routines, and complex relational databases are all part of our daily lives. As a result, our 
perceptive apparatuses are constantly tuned to diverse and often contradictory frequencies, but in 
a way that tends to play out any incongruities as part of what and who we are as humans. Indeed, 
many of us are more likely to feel the absence of these technologies than their presence: for 
example, I frequently feel a visceral frustration at not having Internet access while driving; a 
question pops into my head and—before becoming aware of my physical situation—I can feel 
my body reaching for the Internet to answer it. What feels incongruent is not having the Internet 
available, as it forces me back into the confines of a body that I no longer identify as being the 
sum total of my self. Indeed, even as I feel this bodily re-containment as a reductive violence 
played out on my consciousness, I nonetheless continue to hurtle along the highway at a speed 
that insists that I too am propelled, just as much as my automobile. 
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Two things are revealed in this scenario: firstly, that to the extent that our agency pertains 
to our actions in the world, we are today compelled to think of ourselves through the lens of 
technology; secondly, that this has always been the case. Of course, if the second point is true, 
then we can safely say that the first point is not a new one. However, one feature that separates 
our current mixed reality—the mixed reality of digital and analogue technologies—from that of 
the past is precisely the fact that we are able to marvel at our own ability to navigate so 
seamlessly from one realm to another. As Mark Hansen notes, the question of how we can 
accomplish this feat so fluidly ‘did not need to be posed so long as perceptual experience (with 
only atypical exceptions) remained within a single experiential frame—so long, that is, as 
experience typically occurred within a single perceptual world as a coupling to a single form of 
extension or homogeneous outside’ (2006a: 8).  
These, then, are the conditions of our posthumanity, conditions that highlight the 
continued importance of investigating the relations between humans and technology.
i
 As a result, 
the stakes of any particular construction of posthumanism also loom large today: presuming that 
the constraints within which we construct posthumanism as a problematic will directly inform 
what we posthumans are revealed to be (and to have been), drawing out the predicates of a 
particular thinker’s narration of human-technology relations becomes paramount to 
understanding the effects that narration will have. Simply put, if posthumanism aims to register 
the changing relations of humans and technologies—or, more broadly, the complex interactions 
‘between individuals as living beings and the historical element’ (Agamben 2009: 6)—this essay 
starts from the position that such registration is not (and cannot be) neutral, so that the task of a 
would be cultural theorist is to uncover such bias, and to unpack the perspective that it services. 
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These are the stakes of this examination of Mark Hansen’s construction of 
posthumanism—which I call organismic posthumanism—particularly as it is presented in his 
three key texts Embodying Technesis, New Philosophy for New Media, and Bodies in Code.
ii
 
While the subject matters of these texts frequently overlap, the primary focus of each nonetheless 
unfolds distinct components of Hansen’s expanding argument for a posthuman view that 
simultaneously avows the radical (as opposed to relative) exteriority of technology and the 
primacy of embodiment: Embodying Technesis unpacks the ‘putting-into-discourse’ of 
technology as it has taken place across otherwise divergent strains of contemporary theory, 
showing how this action disavows technology’s material specificity; New Philosophy for New 
Media insists that there is an affective topology of human perception that is fundamentally 
tactile, encompassing vision such that the latter relates to a primordial ‘haptics’ that grounds it; 
and Bodies in Code synthesizes these perspectives, insisting more strongly than either previous 
book that technology is bound up in human embodiment itself, and that we can thus best 
understand human technogenesis through a re-reading of the operational perspective invoked by 
theorists of autopoiesis. Collectively, then, Hansen’s oeuvre seeks to give ‘a robust account of 
technology in its irreducible materiality that exists beyond discourse and representation’ (Hayles 
2000: 7), while also evincing an ‘“originary” coupling of the human and the technical’ that 
grounds experience as such, and which ‘can only be known through its effects’ (Hansen 2006a: 
9).  
 Put simply, I argue that Hansen’s perspective is ultimately haunted by the 
representational logic that it moves against. In this, I do not repudiate Hansen’s argument as 
such, but rather reject one of its central underlying implications: that the extra-discursive 
materiality of technology might be accessed, linguistically, without attaching a meaning to it that 
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is foreign to this materiality. Such access, then, generates a bias that is naturalized through the 
notion of technology per se, since the latter masks its contingency. In particular, I argue that this 
bias is already nascent in Embodying Technesis as the concept of technesis itself, and that it 
reaches full maturity in the organismic perspective that grounds the title-term of Bodies in Code. 
To this end, the essay begins with an examination of technesis as it is initially developed by 
Hansen, demonstrating the necessity from which it sprang, the contribution that Hansen’s 
reading makes, and its ultimate limitations. From here, the essay articulates Hansen’s argument 
for an affective topology of the senses, corroborating the increased importance of digital 
technologies in this perspective through a brief comparison of Roberto Lazzarini’s skulls (as read 
by Hansen) and my own piece Sound. Finally, this comparison pivots the argument towards a 
critical analysis of Hansen’s robust account of primary tactility, an analysis that concludes the 
essay by agreeing with most of Hansen’s assertions, but also by insisting that they remain within 
the (representational) logic of language. In closing, then, I argue that what is accomplished by 
Hansen’s putting-into-discourse of technesis is, paradoxically, a re-staging of the constitutive 
ambivalence of deconstruction that shows the latter to be a promising premise for specifying the 
relation between humans and technology.  
*** 
Embodying Technesis came into print in the midst of what Hansen identifies as a shift in science 
and technology studies, moving towards a paradigm that gives precedence to concrete 
experiential effects over abstract theoretical significance. This change was necessitated by the 
dramatic disjunction existing between technologists and theorists of technology, aptly 
summarized by Hayles: 
From the point of view of the technologist, the critical theorist knows nothing about the workings of 
technology and demonstrates it by talking in terms so abstract that material objects are vaporized into mere 
words; from the point of view of the theorist, the technologist is so stuck on nuts and bolts that he remains 
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oblivious of the fact that these objects are never simply present in themselves, being always already enframed 
by cultural assumptions and mediated by discursive practices. (2000: v) 
Thus, with the aim of conjoining material practice with theoretical sophistication, the 
conventional ‘top-down “diffusion” model’ of analysis has been increasingly replaced by 
translative approaches that attend to the minutiae of everyday activity.
iii
 As emblematic of this 
perspective, Hansen cites Isaac Asimov’s famous suggestion that the lived experience of modern 
man has been more dramatically shaped by practical inventions such as the automobile than it 
has by more (discursively) consequential shifts in scientific knowledge like Einstein’s theory of 
relativity. What require attention, in this view, are thus not the major events, ruptures, or 
characteristics that are readily available as objective knowledge in a historical macro-narrative, 
but rather the complex relations that contextualize these events and comprise the ground for the 
narrative itself (Hansen 2000: 1-2). 
 This is a shift that Hansen agrees with in principal, so that the task he finds currently at 
hand is to specify the ways that everyday technologies profoundly impact our lives, rather than 
simply insisting that they do so. However, in the case of technology this is not so simply 
accomplished, because ‘technologies underlie and inform our basic “ways of seeing” the world’ 
(Hansen 2000: 2-3): the ways in which our daily activities presuppose technology function to 
foreclose the possibility of analyzing them in isolation. As a result, Hansen insists that ‘despite 
its irreducible concreteness, technology’s experiential impact must accordingly be considered to 
be first and foremost indirect and holist’ (2000: 2). In short, to the extent that technologies 
structure perception they also elude it, resulting in the tremendous difficulty—perhaps even the 
impossibility—of thinking technology ‘in its own terms.’ 
 For Hansen, this evasion not only explains the tendency to think technology abstractly, 
but also leads to what he calls the ‘culturalist assimilation of technology’ (2000: 3). In this latter 
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case, Hansen insists that all too frequently the (true) observation that technologies cannot exist 
outside social systems is conflated with the (false) claim that they can ‘be captured by the 
interpretive tools germane to such systems’ (2000: 3). Thus, Hansen does not take issue with the 
culturalist position that understands technology to be part of a complex social network, but he is 
resolute that technology is also more than this, and radically so.  
 Indeed, it is precisely this radicality that is at stake in Hansen’s overall project, as one of 
the motivating factors in his writing is the claim that twentieth-century theoretical texts ‘from 
Freud and Heidegger to Lacan, Derrida, and Deleuze and Guattari’ (Hansen 2000: 93) relativize 
the exteriority of technology, subordinating it to the more central overriding theoretical purposes 
of each of their intellectual projects. In this, these theorists interpret the ‘host of concrete 
materializations through which technologies impact our practices […] according to “logics” that 
are strongly posthermeneutical,’ ignoring the fact that technology influences our embodied lives 
‘at a level below the “threshold” of representation’ (Hansen 2000: 4).
iv
 In so doing, technology is 
rendered an object of knowledge, and is thus exchangeable for other objects within the logic of 
representation. Simply put, so long as technology is taken to be grounded in representation, its 
(for Hansen innate) potential to intervene from outside of this system is effaced.   
 Hansen uses the term technesis to account for this representationalist reduction, defining 
it firstly as the ‘putting-into-discourse’ of technology. Crucially, Hansen argues that technesis 
not only reduces technology by underspecifying it, it actually alters the materiality of technology 
by re-specifying it differently. Simply put, ‘technology itself’ disappears in technesis except in 
the form of alibi. The representation of technology through technesis bears as much similarity to 
the material specificity of technology as a bank robber wearing a Richard Nixon mask bears to 
the former American president; in both cases, the contents of the mask (i.e. technology and 
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Nixon’s facial features) are subjugated to the logic of the events in which they are staged (i.e. 
language and a bank robbery).  
 Hansen offers numerous ways in which this representationalist reduction is enacted, 
emphasizing how in each case technology is abstracted into a disciplinary logic that discursively 
precedes it, ignoring the fact that (for Hansen) technology exists in its own right within a strata 
of reality that is fundamentally pre-discursive.
v
 Importantly, each example that Hansen offers 
flows from a broader critique of Derrida’s deconstructive grammatology, particularly its claim—
in Hansen’s view—for language as ‘the exclusive or privileged faculty of experience’ (Hansen 
2000: 14). Via a critique of grammatology, Hansen mounts his thesis that technesis employs 
technology as an abstract cipher for an internal otherness that, while constitutive of texts, does 
not pertain to technology. In short, he argues that linguistic logocentrism—despite manifold 
claims to the contrary—continues to dominate the various ways in which technology has been 
engaged within (at least western) philosophical discourse.  
 However, this critique of Derrida merits further consideration. Hansen’s argument 
specifies that within Derrida’s work technology is consistently restricted to a ‘model of the text 
as machine’ (2000: 86). In particular, he sees in Derrida (as in other twentieth-century 
poststructuralist theorists) an inversion of the machine metaphor as it had developed since at 
least the seventeenth century (predominantly in the form of the clock), wherein machines were 
‘consistently employed as a heuristic for conceptualizing what is proper to the human’ (2000: 
84). Through this inversion, a machinic ontology of textuality is produced wherein ‘language 
assumes the role of a machine that runs independently of the phenomenal and rhetorical 
categories governing lived experience’ (Hansen 2000: 82) such that ‘for the first time, the 
machine is actually deployed as a metaphor for technology itself’ (Hansen 2000: 83). In this, 
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Hansen argues, technology is domesticated by Derridean textuality, such that it is dependent on 
the movement of différance to the same extent that writing (in the restricted sense) is.  As such, 
technology is not a site of inquiry in its own right, but is rather restricted to a ‘doubly derivative 
status’ that simply lends support to ‘the totalizing grasp of [Derrida’s] ontology of différance’ 
(2000: 85).   
 The merit of this critique of Derrida is that it articulates, constatively and performatively, 
the tremendous difficulty of the task that Hansen has set himself in trying to account for 
technology ‘in its own terms.’ Its drawback, though, is that it rests on a fundamental misreading 
of Derrida’s grammatology. Emphatically, Derrida does not idealistically reduce everything to 
language when he insists (in Of Grammatology) that ‘there is no outside-text’ (1974: 158): as has 
frequently been noted, the popularized translation of ‘Il n'y a pas de hors-texte’ as ‘there is 
nothing outside the text’ is both incorrect and misleading in that it suggests an ontological 
understanding of language (where language would, in theory, be capable of total description).  
Instead, Derrida’s point is that ‘what opens meaning and language is writing as the 
disappearance of natural presence’ (Derrida 1974: 159), in the sense that language is a condition 
of legibility, even if it always renders its objects paradoxical and incomplete. Importantly, then, 
the term ‘opens’ indicates that Derrida does not claim that language is ‘the exclusive or 
privileged faculty of experience’ (Hansen 2000: 14), as Hansen’s argument requires. Instead, 
Derrida’s formulation insists simply that, insofar as there is meaning (i.e. signification, sense, an 
interpreted goal, etc.) this meaning is contingent on the instability and ambiguity inherent in 
language. Thus, it is resolutely not Derrida’s belief that language determines bodily experience 
per se, but rather that it is the technology through which experience is registered as such, and 
that this registration reveals both language and experience as always-already simultaneously 
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present and absent in their relation. For example, my digestive system might well behave extra-
linguistically, but my experience of it as a functional operation (i.e. a system that digests my 
food) is linguistic; I can say neither that my digestive system preexists, for me, its meaning 
(which would be to say that it pre-exists itself), nor that the meaning of my digestive system pre-
exists it (because I can only know it insofar as I can experience it).
vi
 For Derrida, the same is the 
case for technology.  
 Put simply, the object of Derrida’s critique is not experience (as Hansen claims), but 
knowledge: to the extent that the machine appears in Derrida as a metaphor for technology itself, 
it does so as a metaphor, which is to say as a substitution for the (impossible) necessity of 
technology, for its paradoxical presence/absence. Indeed, this ambiguity is even exemplified in a 
passage from Derrida that Hansen cites in his argument. Consider the following:  
A certain sort of question about the meaning and origin of writing precedes, or at least merges with, a certain 
type of question about the meaning and origin of technics. That is why the notion of technique can never 
simply clarify the notion of writing. (cited in Hansen 2000: 85) 
For Hansen, this passage exemplifies the machine’s ‘foundation in différance’ (2000: 85), a view 
which positions grammatology as an identifiable ontology. However, this neglects the crucial 
hesitation in Derrida’s writing: in his parenthetical ‘or at least merges with,’ Derrida gestures to 
the paradoxical temporality at the core of deconstruction, the impossibility of answering 
questions of ‘meaning and unknowability.’ In Of Grammatology, this impossibility is figured as 
a trace (or ‘arche-trace’), a mark that ‘was never constituted except by a non-origin […] which 
thus becomes the origin of the origin’ and which cannot be marked by empiricism (Derrida 1974: 
61). Clearly, then, Hansen’s implication that Derrida submits technology to a structural logic 
only tells half of the story, and misses the explicitly strategic aspect of Derrida’s writing: to the 
extent that Derrida positions writing as preceding technology, he does so keenly aware (as 
Spivak notes) that he is operating ‘according to the very vocabulary of the thing he delimits’ 
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(Derrida, cited in Spivak 1974: xviii). Indeed, this is why the notion of technique can never 
simply clarify the notion of writing; they are all bound together in a paradoxical linguistic logic 
(a notion-ality?) that always performs something supplementary to its claims.  
 Thus, to say that technology is reduced by grammatology is problematic on two counts: 
firstly, it ignores this statement’s congruence with grammatology on the point that technology 
can never be fully represented—can never be fully present—in language. Secondly, it assumes 
that such full presence is in fact possible, in the sense that language might reduce technology 
rather than ambiguously constitute it. Simply put, Hansen’s claim that grammatology reduces the 
exteriority of technology rests on a translation of grammatology into a totalizing structural 
system of meaning. Moreover, this reduction allows Hansen to naturalize technology outside of 
language, while nonetheless operating its force within it: if technology is truly radically exterior 
to language in the way that Hansen indicates, how could it possibly interact with the linguistic 
paradigm that characterizes the type of meaning that Hansen requires? 
 Hansen is certainly aware of these quandaries, but believes they are symptomatic of a 
‘culturally ingrained logocentrism that compels us […] to translate technological materiality into 
discourse’ (2000: 52). In contrast, then, Hansen turns to Bourdieu’s account of mimeticism to 
develop a notion of a bodily hermeneutic that avoids ‘translation or delegation into language [by 
requiring us] to learn to use our mimetic bodily “sense”’ (Hansen 2000: 52). This ‘practical 
mimesis’ takes place below the threshold of knowledge as it is staged in representation, and thus 
yields embodied ‘knowledge’ that can ‘only be experienced through mimetic reproduction, never 
through translation into language’ (Hansen 2000: 52), a necessity that Bourdieu suggests is 
‘particularly clear in non-literate societies, where inherited knowledge can only survive in the 
incorporated state’ (cited in Hansen 2000: 51).
vii
 For Hansen, then, developing this mimetic 
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bodily sense is a promising method of unshackling bodily experience from the profoundly 
restrictive dependence on representation (and cognition) that grammatology imposes.   
 However, this raises the question: isn’t cognition included in embodiment? That is, it is at 
least possible that the ‘mimetic faculty’ that Hansen suggests already exists as cognition, as the 
body’s way of representing itself to itself.
viii
 Hansen’s objection to this suggestion might be that 
embodiment remains subjected to representation, but this would neglect (as shown above) the 
profound avowal of that which is erased in representation. Moreover, to the extent that 
grammatology recognizes a materiality of language, does this not indicate the kind of sensory 
retraining that he is suggesting? It is a slippery point, but I would suggest that this is so not only 
because—as Hansen insists—there is a logic to the body that is external to language (which is 
certainly true, though to what extent the two might interact remains in question), but also 
because identifying the problematic of embodied knowledge as distinct from that of language 
depends on a (provisional, at least) separation of mind and body that has by now been so 
thoroughly and routinely deconstructed that, for most contemporary readers, the separation of the 
two cannot be sustained. In this sense, Hansen abstracts the body into a primordial blank slate, 
producing a normative ‘body’ that is not connected to any particular embodiment, thereby taking 
the body as a given.
ix
  
Thus, to the extent that Hansen critiques the (reductive) identities produced by 
representation, he is perfectly in agreement with a deconstructive approach. Where he differs is 
in the belief that we can intentionally develop faculties that are—and forever remain—
fundamentally foreign to intention, but that are still meaningful. If we were to really take 
seriously his call to develop a bodily sense that is not subject to language, then, we would have 
to do so without having set out, intentionally, to accomplish this. Not only is this impossible, but 
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it is an impossibility that is structured according to the very paradoxical logic of language that 
Derrida’s grammatology writes.  
Of course, Hansen is not unaware of this paradox. Indeed, the final pages of Embodying 
Technesis turn to Benjamin as a means of pointing ‘beyond the impasse of technesis [by] 
refusing to collapse the technological real into representation and by linking it to embodiment’ 
(Hansen 2000: 263). Again, though, this reinforces more than undermines Derrida’s account. 
Moreover, how precisely we can ‘make sense of technology’s diffuse, amorphous corporeal 
impact without filtering it through language’ (Hansen 2000: 263, emphasis added) remains 
underdeveloped in Hansen’s text. Or rather, perhaps it is performatively overdeveloped, which is 
to say that Embodying Technesis performs a leap of faith—a leap into impossibility—that it 
cannot avow.  What Hansen accomplishes, then, is not so much a movement beyond language to 
technology, but rather a re-staging of the dramatic and paradoxical ambivalence that language 
performs.  
*** 
If Hansen’s notion of technesis does not convincingly refute—or side-step—the textual logic of 
Derrida’s grammatology, it nonetheless remains a powerful analytical tool for specifying the 
interaction of representation, embodiment, and technology. For Hansen, this interaction is 
embodiment, which is to say that he insists that ‘any system involving “information” requires an 
interpreter, and that interpreter is the material human body grounded in the wetware of our 
sensorimotor systems’ (Lenoir 2004: xxiii). Importantly, then, Hansen mobilizes an affective 
understanding of embodiment that accords it both ontological and perceptual 
priority/precedence. For Hansen, the body exists in its affective dimension prior to its 
articulation in the senses; further, it actually serves as the frame through which these senses 
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come to be understood as such. As Lenoir summarizes, in Hansen’s account ‘the affective body 
is the “glue” that underpins consciousness and connects it with subperceptual sensorimotor 
processes’ (2004: xxiv).  
 Hansen’s articulation of this pre-subjective affectivity, especially in the mature form that 
it takes in Bodies in Code, is considered in greater detail below. Here, I emphasize the relation of 
vision to embodiment that this perspective entails, and particularly how this relation is revealed 
in and through contemporary technologies. Understanding Hansen’s account of vision will help 
to contextualize his views on perception in general, which in turn will elucidate the precise sense 
in which the body, for Hansen, exists as a unified field that precedes—logically, if not 
chronologically or developmentally—the differentiation of the senses (Hansen 2006a: 64). 
Simply put, Hansen understands vision to be a figuration of embodied process, rather than an 
abstract power that informs it: vision is not (strictly speaking) a medium, but is instead a 
technological extension of the medium of embodiment.  
Hansen illustrates this through an analysis of Roberto Lazzarini’s installation skulls 
(2000, see images). First exhibited at the Whitney Museum of Modern Art, skulls consists in four 
sculpted skulls, each mounted at approximately eye-level in the centre of a different wall of a 
small, , clean, and bright four-walled room.
x
 Lazzarini created the skulls by digitizing an actual 
skull as a two-dimensional digital image. After being subjected to an array of (two-dimensional) 
image editing techniques, the image is then ported to the simulated three-dimensional space of a 
computer-modelling program. In turn, the resulting model—or rather, the resulting digital image 
of a model—is outputted to a rapid prototyping machine that ‘re-sculpts’ the skulls—three-
dimensionally—from resin, bone, and pigment (Lazzarini 2000).
xi
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In effect, skulls translates literal and digitally imaged three-dimensionality into one 
another, but also combines two-dimensional and three-dimensional realities. This oscillation 
between materialities and dimensionalities ‘creates an unsettling spatial paradox [wherein the 
skulls] appear to expand and contract as [the viewer’s] vantage point shifts, suggesting 
something both static and moving’ (Lazzarini 2000). As a result, skulls can never entirely be 
resolved in perspectival space in two senses: firstly, the ‘proper’ viewing perspective is different 
for all four skulls arrayed around the room, so that the visual solidity of one coincides with a 
liminal position in the others; secondly, and more importantly, because the skulls are modeled 
using two-dimensional distortion techniques the depth of the individual sculptural objects 
‘interferes with the illusionary resolution of perspectival distortion’ (Hansen 2004: 202). As a 
result, the ‘the perceptual experience of the work yields an oscillation or leveling of the figure-
ground distinction’ (Hansen 2004: 202).  
 For Hansen, this ambivalence forecloses the possibility of visually mastering the work: 
although skulls is visually perceived, the content of this perception is not visual per se in that it 
displays a logic that is fundamentally at odds with that of vision. In fact, Hansen argues that what 
is seen in skulls is not really a perception at all in the conventional sense, but rather a disjunction 
that exists between human perception and digital technologies. In this respect, we don’t so much 
see the installation as we feel—affectively—the inaccessibility of its digital material to our 
senses. That is, skulls presents a ‘realignment of human experience from the visual register of 
perception (be it in an “optical” or “haptic” mode) to a properly bodily register of affectivity in 
which vision, losing its long-standing predominance, becomes a mere trigger for a nonvisual 
haptic apprehension’ (Hansen 2004: 209). Thus, although the installation does not afford ‘a 
direct apprehension of an alien space that is digital, [it does yield a] bodily apprehension of just 
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how radically alien the formal field of the computer is from the perspective of the phenomenal 
modes of embodied spatial experience’ (Hansen 2004: 206). In so doing, skulls manifests the (for 
Hansen) radical exteriority of digital technology to the logic of vision, but also how visuality 
(which includes, for Hansen, figurations of the other senses) is shaped in terms of ‘more visceral’ 
bodily elements.    
 Importantly, then, Lazzarini’s warped skulls institute a warped space that is sensibly felt 
by the viewer, even if only as a disjunction between digital materiality and the physical laws that 
we are accustomed to. The point is that ‘the body continues to be the active framer of the image, 
even in a digital regime’ (Lenoir 2004: xviii). That is, Hansen argues that the spatial disjunction 
experienced in skulls is situated in and as the viewer: rather than a gap between internal and 
external sensation, this disjunction is an interval within the viewer’s body, a ‘bodily spacing’ that 
indicates the precedence of an embodied organism over its sensory perceptions. Put differently, 
by rendering the spatial activity of the participant’s vision useless (since they are unable to 
delineate their distance from the skulls through conventional geometric perspective), skulls 
initiates a shift to an ‘alternate mode of perception rooted in our bodily faculty of proprioception’ 
(Hansen 2004: 203). In this way, the work functions by catalyzing an embodied sense of the 
skulls’ form (i.e. an ‘affective process of embodied form-giving’) that creates a place within our 
bodies that, in its creation, gives us a ‘sense of the “weirdness” of digital topology’ (Hansen 
2004: 203).  
 For Hansen, skulls is thus exemplary of the potential of new media art: rather than citing 
digitality as an abstract placeholder figured through arbitrary metaphors (i.e. the various visual 
associations that we have come to associate with cyberspace), skulls ‘presents us with actual 
artifacts from the digital realm’ (Hansen 2004: 204) that are not ‘channeled through the 
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coordinates of an image designed for interface with (human) vision’ (Hansen 2004: 203). As a 
result, the installation acts as a ‘cipher or index of a process fundamentally heterogeneous to our 
constitutive perceptual ratios’ (Hansen 2004: 204): the experience of the piece takes place as an 
affective response in the spectator that correlates to the work’s digital topology while 
nonetheless remaining radically discontinuous with it. In the experience of skulls (and other 
exemplary works of media art), Hansen believes that we can bodily access a material specificity 
of technology—or rather, we can appreciate the radicality of a particular technology’s 
inaccessibility—without reducing it to language. (2004: 205). 
 It bears emphasizing that to the extent that this is the case, it is accomplished via a 
movement of vision into the body that Hansen describes under the auspices of the body’s 
affective topology. With this in mind, consider as a counter-example the piece Sound (2001), a 
piano performance consisting of a combination of piano preparations, extended techniques, and 
fast playing with the piano’s sustain pedal depressed.
xii
 First presented in the context of a 
contemporary music recital, Sound utilizes microphones that are placed inside the piano, routed 
through a computer featuring sound-processing software, and plugged into loudspeakers. Despite 
this setup, though, the computer is not powered on, so that the physical sound of the piano is in 
no way altered by the digital technology that is present: the piece is simply a piece for 
piano…and yet it isn’t. 
 Somewhat predictably, audience members often hear effects generated by the 
microphone-speaker-computer setup when listening to Sound, despite no such effects being 
literally present. More remarkably, though, this tendency obtains even in the context of highly 
trained listeners, for whom the sound-world of the piece is by no means novel. Moreover, these 
skilled listeners—and I am not using the term ‘skilled’ ironically—are sometimes even able to 
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specify particular effects: audience members attest to hearing various equalization filters (e.g. 
high-pass, shelving, and parametric), delays, and shifts in synthesized reverb and dynamics. In 
fact, I have anecdotally noticed that the more sophisticated a listener is—the more they are able 
to specify what they’ve heard in a given piece—the more likely they are to experience highly 
complex and specified hallucinations during Sound’s performance.
xiii
    
 Sound is not a sonic hoax, because it does not ultimately deceive the listener’s ears. That 
is, the sounds that the listener (mis)identifies as digitally produced are nonetheless audible and 
even properly identifiable, in the sense that the listener is able to specify (via the terminology of 
digital technology) the particular sounds that they are hearing.
xiv
 Moreover, it is plausible that the 
digital technologies represented on stage actually serve to increase the audibility of the nuances 
of the piece, because they signal a mastery of timbre that is often neglected in acoustic 
instruments (i.e. they emphasize the fact a single piano pitch consists in a series of frequencies). 
Rather than being a hoax, then, the technologies presented on-stage in Sound act as a rubric for 
the sound-world of the piece.  
 What is of interest here is how this rubric actually functions. Operationally, the 
technology (not) used in Sound is more familiar (i.e. more sensible) than the acoustic phenomena 
from which it was developed. In this sense, the piece employs a simulation wherein 
representations—the sounds of particular effects—are detached from any necessary attachment 
to their acoustic provenance. As a result, it is not only the case that the digital technologies offer 
a visual point of entry into the sound-world of the piece, but also that they offer a point of 
departure from the linear causality—the instrumentality—of the acoustic instrument (i.e. the 
piano, as the sounding mechanism of a score or musical intention). In a mixed reality context 
such as that suggested by the technologies represented on stage, then, the physics of the 
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performance—the question of what, materially, causes a given sonic event—subtly shifts into a 
kind of ‘pataphysics wherein the imaginary sonic reality precedes its cause.
xv
 Simply put, the 
computer functions as an alibi for limitless representational manipulation, so that the listener 
accepts that the sonic events are not completely constrained by a recognizable causality. That is, 
the computer creates an illusion of a certain type of music—live electronic manipulation of an 
acoustic instrument—that presents itself as music without illusions.
xvi
 
 Indeed, this ‘limitlessness’ is the flip-side of the listeners’ tendency to project specific 
technical manipulations onto the piece: listeners’ (mis)recognition of the processing is frequently 
accompanied by questions about other aspects of Sound’s sound-world. Often, these questions 
come from a lack of second-order identification of the phantom processes: for example, a 
phantom EQ might be heard as one that is regularly deployed in the program MaxMSP, which 
would lead to questions about other (phantom) manipulations that the listener did not recognize 
as being conventional in that programming environment.
xvii
 Thus, a series of questions are asked 
(e.g. ‘Is another software program being run in parallel?’ or ‘Was that accomplished by 
misappropriating such and such object in Max?’) that not only presume the event, but also 
understand it to be a technical fait accompli. Rather than creating disjunction in the listener—
rather than causing them to question whether things are as they seem—these questions are 
couched not only in the certainty that the processing took place, but also in the assuredness that 
they took place as identifiable, predictable, and repeatable technical manipulations within the 
computer. With the presence of the computer, the de facto assumption is that anything that can 
be represented sonically to the listener can also be represented within the computer, and that with 
this representation comes a potential for manipulation that is virtually unconstrained. As Paul 
Théberge (among others) has noted, ‘a computer is both a machine and a social relation’ (212); 
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in Sound, the machine-computer is extended through the technology of the piano, which empties 
it of its instrumentality to feed it back as a paradoxical relationality. Sound, then, is virtual music 
par excellence, where the boundlessness of the virtual is acted under the alibi of computer 
technology that it does not otherwise employ. 
 This is notable in the context of this essay because it is the opposite of what Hansen 
accounts in skulls. Whereas Hansen demonstrates that skulls renders techno-logic visceral 
because it cannot be represented by the senses, Sound offers a ‘pure representation’ of 
technology that captures viscerality in its exchange. In Sound, the boundlessness of the virtual is 
acted precisely through the way that it opens the senses to its ‘pataphysics, to a willingness to 
accept seemingly unconstrained causality without giving up the notion of causality itself (that is, 
without leaving the realm of conventional representation). Thus, if skulls catalyzes a 
(disjunctive) perception of the grounding of vision in pre-sensory embodiment, Sound suggests 
that the reverse also takes place. That is, in Sound the affective body partakes in a logic of 
representation wherein ‘the body itself’ moves into the object of its senses, feeling—
’presensorily’—its profound complicity with the non-causal causality of grammatology. Simply 
put, the grounded and constrained physics of the body is excavated into a play of representation.  
 Indeed, this understanding is coded into Hansen’s claim—further discussed below—that 
virtuality resides in and as analog subjectivity, which includes as its corollary the disarticulation 
of virtuality from digital technologies. That is, although virtuality has an affinity with digitality, 
it nonetheless ‘stretches back to the proto-origin of the human’ (2006a: x-xi). Put bluntly, the 
virtual is (for Hansen) the space into which technics externalizes the body. The difference with 
Sound, though, is that the body proper is not externalized, but rather translated (or re-embodied) 
into a visual representation.
xviii
 Moreover, this process feeds back to re-insist that the initial body 
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is subject to representation: to the extent that the listener feels the piece, they do so within a logic 
that is suggested by its representations rather than via a spacing that would ground this logic.
xix
 
To the extent that the body is externalized into virtual space, then, it is also always-already 
virtual.
xx
  
 This does not undermine Hansen’s reading of skulls. However what Sound does 
demonstrate is the leap of faith that Hansen makes in order to move from his perceptually and 
cognitively based reading of skulls to his positing of the body as primordial (and thus pre-
cognitive and –conceptual). Without this leap, for example, we would be forced to ask why 
vision is not accorded the radicality that technology is? If vision takes place at an ontological 
level that is different from the embodiment that grounds it, doesn’t this mean that there is a part 
of vision, however small, that is not accounted for in embodiment? As such, doesn’t Hansen 
reduce vision to the affective logic of the body that he expounds? If so, what is accomplished in 
this reduction?  
*** 
 What I have attempted thus far is a simple re-contextualization of Hansen’s thought: 
rather than accepting his cogent analyses as proof-positive of the structure of subjectivity that he 
advocates, I have demonstrated that his writing necessarily performs a gap between presence and 
absence that its content covers over. As a result, I have suggested that rather than an affective 
body preceding the senses, the two necessarily exist in tension with one another. However, in 
insisting on this tension I am not suggesting that affectivity is antecedent to the senses either, but 
am rather importuning the impossibility of establishing a hierarchy in their relation. Put 
differently, while Hansen’s perspective cannot be unequivocally true in the way that he hopes, it 
nonetheless performs an important intervention into the potentially stagnant discourse of 
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deconstruction: if contemporary theorists have become comfortable with the paradoxical play of 
presence and absence brought to the fore in deconstruction, Hansen’s writing serves a decisive 
role in re-introducing the body as a site of discursive discomfort. Thus, if Derrida’s work was 
necessitated by a historical context that presumed presence, Hansen writes in a time that has 
perhaps—at least with respect to Humanities scholarship—moved too far the other way.  
 With this in mind, I offer in what follows a closer consideration of Hansen’s account of 
affectivity, presented in an effort to specify Hansen’s ‘organismic’ construction of technological 
posthumanism as the twin presence of the manifold absences that have been made manifest in 
Humanities scholarship over the past forty years. Hansen’s posthumanism is perhaps uniquely 
suited to articulate this perspective since, of the dominant strains of posthumanism that obtain in 
the discourse, Hansen’s perspective is amongst the most avowedly humanist: whereas one might 
argue that Hayles, for example, insinuates humanist values into the ground of her claims for 
expanded understandings of embodiment, materiality, and meaning, Hansen restages these 
expansions within the internal spacing of presensory human affectivity. Accordingly, Hansen 
acknowledges that it is specifically human embodiment that ‘takes on a truly unprecedented 
responsibility [at this particularly crucial moment in our coevolution with technology]: the 
responsibility of constraining and thereby specifying the process through which information 
“objects”—images, space, events—are actually generated’ (2006a: 176). This distinction 
between Hansen and Hayles is crucial, because it relates directly to how value—broadly 
construed to include meaning, ethics, and politics—operates in the schema. For Hayles (as well 
as for related but less digitally oriented theorists such as Butler) value appears as an injunction to 
mean, so that the exciting possibility opened by new technologies is their affordance of new 
modes of represented individual agency; value is external in this reading, in the sense that it is a 
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motivating principle of Hayles’ thought. For Hansen, in contrast, value is produced via the 
body’s internal spacing, so that what is exposed by virtual technologies is ‘the violence exerted 
on bodily life by generic categories of social intelligibility and the politics of recognition’ 
(Hansen 2006a: 147). Thus, if Hayles’ posthumanism ultimately reinscribes the human, Hansen’s 
does so doubly, but with a key difference inhering in how they position their intervention in the 
discourse of posthumanism: whereas Hayles figures her thought as unwinding embodiment 
outwards into intermediating machinic materialities (that themselves feed back to bodies), 
Hansen works in the inverse direction, folding new technologies—including new modes of 
perception—back into the primary tactility of embodied subjects. Hansen is not interested in new 
technologies for their potential to reconfigure what value is, but rather for their potential to 
reconfigure how value acts.
xxi
  
 To grapple with this shift, it is first necessary to exfoliate the particular understanding of 
technology that is at the core of Hansen’s thought, and which exists in contradistinction to the 
notion of technesis discussed above. Fundamentally, Hansen considers technology to be 
intimately bound up with human embodiment. Quite simply, Hansen argues that every 
technology exists in relation to human embodiment and speaks to ‘the body’s role as an 
“invariant,” a fundamental access onto the world’ (2006a: 26). While technologies may 
‘refunctionalize’ (2006a: 26) the body, then, they do not institute any ontological shift that would  
threaten phenomenological accounts of embodiment. Instead, technicity is understood by Hansen 
to be a process of ‘exteriorization.’  
 Importantly, though, Hansen does not consider this relation to exteriority to be something 
‘merely added on to some “natural” core of embodied life’ (2006a: ix), but rather takes technicity 
to be ‘a constitutive dimension of embodiment from the start’ (2006a: x). In this respect, he 
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echoes Butler in registering a ‘turn’ at the core of our subjective relations, for Hansen hinging on 
technology: technologies extend our interface with the environment, but the reconfiguration that 
this performs points back to a body as its source. In this sense, then, a ‘technical element […] has 
always inhabited and mediated our embodied coupling with the world’ (Hansen 2006a: 26).  
While Butler understands this coupling to be the continual and reiterative process of subject 
formation, though, Hansen understands it as the exteriorization of an anterior subjectivity: since 
Hansen takes the body to be ‘invariant,’ he is able to mobilize a topological analysis of it. In so 
doing, he figures a gap that is fundamentally different from the deconstructive gap: where the 
former is a spatial separation, the latter is both a performative gap and a dis-identification (hence 
différance’s etymology in both difference and differment). 
 What is notable in this configuration is the conflation of technical and embodied reality 
that it enacts. Simply put, the distinction between virtual reality and so-called flesh reality is 
effaced, for Hansen, so that ‘all reality is “mixed reality” (2006a: 6). In short, ‘there can be no 
difference in kind demarcating virtual reality (in its narrow, technicist sense) from the rest of 
experience’ (Hansen 2006a: 6), because all experience pertains first to an embodied subject. As 
such, virtual reality is not so much something that is produced by technology as it is a 
‘biologically grounded adaptation to the newly acquired technological extensions provided by 
new media’ (Lenoir 2004: xxiv). Virtuality, then, is not only interpreted by analog bodies, but is 
actually included in the constitution of these bodies as such.  
 In this context, Hansen insists on the cultural significance of virtual reality as ‘our 
culture’s privileged pathway for […] exposing the technical element that lies at the heart of 
embodiment’ (Hansen 2006a: 15): paradoxically, the value of virtual reality (again, in its narrow 
sense) is not found in the purported new freedoms that it offers, but rather in the way that its 
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physical latitudes lay bare ‘the enabling constraints of the body’ (Hansen 2006a: 15). Here again, 
then, it is precisely because technics is included within a primordial notion of embodiment that 
we can comprehend virtual reality as a reality at all, which is to say as having enactive capacities 
rather than simply representational or simulational ones. In a sense, then, Hansen is simply 
staging a performance of deconstruction in and as embodiment.  
 In this context, Hansen argues that mixed reality is a transcendental condition for human 
experience. That is, mixed reality designates an ‘”originary” coupling of the human and the 
technical’ that grounds experience as such, and which ‘can only be known through its effects’ 
(Hansen 2006a: 9); while new technologies, specific historical realities, and evolved biologies all 
play a part in determining modes and meanings of perception that are absolutely unique to a 
given individual, the fact of human perception itself—or human ‘information processing,’ as 
Hansen sometimes terms it—nonetheless grounds this specificity. Put simply, while information 
processing may radically transform the instance of embodiment that it points to, the fact that it 
must be directed at an embodied reality always remains. Moreover, Hansen’s conceptualization 
of ‘mixed reality’ includes the assertion that this works both ways, so that an instance of 
embodiment—a human, for example—necessarily operates relative to its surroundings. This 
omnipresent bivalent coupling, then, is precisely what Hansen designates with the term mixed 
reality, effecting a passage ‘from the axiom that all virtual reality is mixed reality to the more 
general axiom that all reality is mixed reality’ (2006a: 5).  
 This persistence of an embodied relation to technics (which is to say, of embodiment) is 
the sense in which mixed reality is both transcendental and omnipresent. Moreover, this status 
means that the effect of technological innovation is not to create new realities, but rather to alter 
the relationship between our perceptual apparatuses and the techno-embodied reality that 
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grounds them: incompatible strata of reality, for example, are not incompatible with our 
conventional perceptions because they are inaccessibly distant, for Hansen, but rather because 
they are too close, they are the ground of perception. In this sense, contemporary technologies 
create different points of contact—quantitatively different in scope, but to such an extent that a 
qualitative difference emerges—between humans and non-humans, that thereby shift the ground 
of perception to give the effect of new strata of reality. In addition, then, Hansen does not accept 
the suggestion that fundamentally new realities emerge from the intermediation of humans and 
machines: while, epistemologically, Hansen characterizes the historical evolution of humans 
technogenetically, he nonetheless insists on an ahistorical mechanism underlying this process 
that grounds epistemological accounts of subject positions in an ontology of primary 
subjectivity. Put simply, the oft-cited extra-discursive characters of technology and embodiment 
are, for Hansen, specifically pre-discursive. Relative to much of posthuman discourse, then, 
Hansen’s position performs the crucial shift of acknowledging the particular worldview that (for 
him) undergirds the entrance of humans and technology into a joint discourse.   
 In this respect our ‘age of total technical mediation’ (Hansen 2006a: 12) is, for Hansen, 
the age where the mixed-ness of reality is exposed. That is, reality has always been a mixture of 
virtuality and actuality, but contemporary technologies dramatize this to an unprecedented 
extent. In Hansen’s often tenebrous prose, the present historico-technical moment is thus dubbed 
the ‘becoming-empirical […] of mixed reality as the transcendental-empirical’ (2006a: 9), such 
that contemporary technologies empirically manifest ‘the condition for the empirical as such’ 
(2006a: 9). Paradoxically, then, Hansen insists that the disembodying tendencies of digital 
technologies serve to make perceptible the embodied reality—which includes technicity—that 
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they depend on. As such, the shift to mixed reality effected in and by contemporary 
technoculture is a paradigmatic, rather than ontological, one.  
 If Hansen insists that mixed reality transcends local technological conditions, this is not 
to diminish the importance of the latter. Indeed, by making mixed reality widely perceptible 
digital technologies bring ‘an opportunity to revalue the meaning and role accorded the body 
within the accepted conceptual frameworks of our philosophical tradition’ (Hansen 2006a: 7). 
Thus, Hansen notes that today’s exemplary mixed reality situations—‘interrupting a meeting to 
get data from a digital database, comparing a two-dimensional architectural drawing with a real-
time three-dimensional visualization, acquiring an image of oneself through the social prosthesis 
of common sense that is contemporary television’ (Hansen 2006a: 8)—are not intended to 
produce an ‘immersive’ experience, in the sense of simulating reality. Instead—as we saw in his 
reading of skulls—Hansen argues that these situations each utilize the ‘capacity of our embodied 
form of life to create reality through motor activity’ (2006a: 8). Prior to the exposure of mixed 
reality through digital technologies, this capacity was entirely unremarkable. Thus, by moving 
perceptual experience beyond a single experiential frame, the question (cited at the beginning of 
this essay) of ‘what makes […] passage from one realm to another so seamless’ (2006a: 8) can 
be asked.   
 In the context of this essay, the point is that Hansen’s understanding of embodiment and 
technicity necessarily re-conceptualizes the body in a way that avows its contingency while still 
retaining its primacy as the ground in which this conflation takes place. I have already argued 
that this understanding is more complicit with deconstruction than Hansen suggests, but it bears 
noting that what is thus at stake is not only a pre-linguistic body, but also an articulation of the 
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‘spacing’ that comprises an organism’s embodiment. In this, Hansen promotes an understanding 
of the body that is based in its operational perspective.
xxii
  
 The logic of this operational perspective is explicitly drawn from contemporary 
autopoietic theories of cognition. In particular, the ‘enactive’ approach promulgated by Varela is 
apt, as it is based on situated, embodied agents. As Varela explains, this approach to cognition 
‘comprises two complementary aspects: (1) the ongoing coupling of the cognitive agent […] that 
is fundamentally mediated by sensorimotor activities; and (2) the autonomous activities of the 
agent whose identity is based on emerging, endogenous configurations (or self-organizing 
patterns) of neuronal activity’ (Varela 1999: 272). For Hansen, then, considering the body in this 
way offers the opportunity to consider it as a bounded entity that is coupled with technics, 
without falling into the reductive binary logic of (non)identity: the body is coupled with technics 
in precisely the sense that all life ‘necessarily involves a “structural coupling” of an organism 
and an environment’ (Hansen 2004: 299). In this approach it is movement, rather than identity, 
that ‘takes center stage as the act which […] correlates, articulates, or mediates between space 
and time’ (Hansen 2006b: 1208). From this, Hansen turns to operationality to provide a means of 
articulating the body as an ‘originary condition of real experience’ (2006a: 9). 
 And yet, (once again) Hansen’s insistence on the term ‘origin’ bears further reflection: 
what is the body’s ‘originary technicity’ if not precisely an example of ‘origin-heterogeneous,’ as 
described by Derrida (1989: 107-108)? Indeed, in showing that the body’s movement ‘speaks to 
a modality of life that lies between and conjoins—that composes—space and time’ (2006b: 
1211), Hansen would seem to be reinforcing the Derridean truism that every identity—in fact, 
every term—is necessarily infected by others that it cannot register: technics itself, in Hansen, is 
placed ‘neither on the side of consciousness, nor on the side of matter, but rather as their 
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mediation, the transduction to which they owe both their coupling and their proper existence’ 
(2006b: 1211). I raise this concern again because Hansen’s response to this critique shifts in 
Bodies in Code: whereas Embodying Technesis focuses on specifying what, precisely, 
technology is, Bodies in Code’s operational emphasis attempts instead to specify how 
embodiment—as the coupling of a body and technicity—produces the effects it does. That is, 
Hansen becomes less interested in what humans and their embodiments categorically are than 
what is entailed by these constructions. In this light, claiming an originary status for the 
(subjective) body amounts to naming it as an enabling constraint for the enactive approach that 
Hansen undertakes: whereas a deconstructive sensibility prevents us from agreeing with the 
definition of a pre-subjective body that Hansen mounts in Embodying Technesis, Hansen’s shift 
in emphasis might permit him to side-step these concerns because he is no longer delineating a 
fully present body per se.  
Indeed, Cary Wolfe has convincingly argued for a view of systems theory (specifically 
that of Luhmann) as the ‘reconstruction of deconstruction’ (Luhmann, cited in Wolfe 2010: 8), 
noting that Derridean deconstruction and Luhmann’s systems theory each approach a similar 
problem from opposite directions. Specifically, both approaches  
make difference their basic category, both temporalize difference and reconstruct meaning as a temporally 
organized context of displacement and deferment. Both regard their fundamental operation (i.e., writing or 
communication, respectively) as an independent process that constitutes the subject rather than lets itself by 
constituted by it. (Schwanitz, cited in Wolfe 2010: 13)  
This is not to efface the difference between the two approaches—Wolfe argues that systems 
theory links deconstructive dynamics ‘to their biological, social, and historical conditions of 
emergence and transformation’ (Wolfe 2010: 8)—but only to point out that Derrida is not 
necessarily opposed to the operational logic that Hansen espouses. 
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 However, this line of argumentation does not ultimately obtain in Hansen’s case, because 
he continually extends the import of his thought beyond this constraint, which is to say beyond a 
deconstructive reading that would understand embodiment’s operational ‘originality to also 
indicate its non-originality. Specifically, Hansen’s shift towards an analysis of effects depends on 
the possibility of extra-linguistic meaning that it moves away from, so that this disavowal of 
grammatology might be considered a ‘meta’ enabling constraint that allows constraint to mean 
something. In this context, though, one wonders if the term ‘origin’ doesn’t thus function as a 
rhetorical bivalence in the text, at once indicating Hansen’s insistence on following through on a 
specific, organismically organized, account of posthumanism, while simultaneously 
acknowledging—rhetorically—the limitations of doing so. Whether this is a conscious tactic on 
Hansen’s part is, perhaps, irrelevant: instead, the ambivalent rhetoric of the text points to an 
opening in it that suspends, if not extinguishes, a deconstructive line of critique. 
 Indeed, the operational emphasis that becomes increasingly prominent in Hansen’s work 
moves his thought ever-closer to the linguistic ambivalence that he continues to hold it in 
contradistinction to. Perhaps most telling, in this respect, is his conception of ‘bodies in code’ as 
a designation of the way that embodiment ‘is necessarily distributed beyond the skin in the 
context of contemporary technics’ (2006a: x): a body in code is ‘a body submitted to and 
constituted by an unavoidable and empowering technical deterritorialization’ (Hansen 2006a: 
20). As with mixed reality, all bodies are ‘bodies in code’ because coding indicates the 
(technical) process through which bodies are coupled with their environment.  
 Here again, though, the ambivalence of this deterritorialization is crucial, because its 
‘technical’ aspect indicates the constraining role that technology plays in addition to its more 
regularly cited extending capacities. Indeed, as Hayles notes, this insistence on the constraints 
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that remain active in digital bodies is at the heart of one of Hansen’s significant points of 
divergence from Deleuze, his frequent interlocutor. Summarizing Hansen’s argument, Hayles 
notes that Deleuze and Guattari serve their own philosophical commitments at the expense of 
reality, doing away with all constraints whatever by refusing to recognize the constraints built 
into self-organization when it takes place in a biological domain (2001: 155). In contrast, Hansen 
suggests bodies in code as a means to understand these constraints not only as enabling 
individual embodiments, but also as part and parcel of the complexity—in the full, evolutionary, 
sense of the term—from which emerges the new organizations and distributions of the senses 
that suggest technology’s importance in the first place.  
 Through coded interactions with the environment, then, the body takes on an agency that 
is at once constrained and distributed. To elucidate how this is the case, Hansen refers to 
Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between the ‘body schema’ and the ‘body image,’ which each offer 
a mutually exclusive way of conceptualizing the body: while the latter pertains to an 
apprehension of the body as an external object, the former privileges the (autopoietic) 
operational perspective that Hansen suggests is primary (Hansen 2006a: 39). Importantly, 
Hansen emphasizes that ‘body image’ is somewhat of a misnomer, as his argumentation (if not 
his argument, per se) hinges on its referring to something ‘much richer […] than a mere 
representation’ (2006a: 133), acting instead as the object of intentional consciousness such that 
to the extent that we apprehend ourselves, we do so through a body image.
xxiii
  In contrast, the 
body schema refers to that which grounds experience as such, in the sense that it refers to the 
particular configuration of the body through which phenomena are made sensible. Put 
differently, the body image emanates from the body, extending it, whereas the body schema is ‘a 
kind of infraempirical or sensible-transcendental basis for intentional operation’ (Hansen 2006: 
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39). While both refer to the body, then, they do so from ‘opposite sides of the intentional relation 
[such that the body schema involves] an extra-intentional operation carried out prior to or outside 
of intentional awareness’ (Gallagher, cited in Hansen 2006: 39).  
 And yet, while the body image and body schema do not overlap, they are also not of 
equal ontological importance for Hansen. That is, the operational perspective of the body schema 
means that, by definition, it relates to its environment: here again, Hansen’s autopoietic 
conformation dictates that organisms react to environmental perturbations by modifying 
themselves in a way that preserves the distinction between their identity and the environment 
such that an autopoietic system is one that ‘continuously produces the components that specify it, 
while at the same time realizing it [i.e. the system] as a concrete unity in space and time [that] 
makes the network of production of components possible’ (Varela 1992: 5). As an autopoietic 
system, then, the body schema includes the technics of the body image as the process through 
which it is exteriorized such that, in an important sense, the body image derives from the body 
schema. Thus, Hansen’s understanding aligns with Varela’s observation that reproduction ‘must 
be considered as an added complexification superimposed on […] an autopoietic unity, [… 
because] only when there is an identity can a unit reproduce’ (Varela 1992: 6). The point for 
Hansen, again, is that the separation of the body from itself that takes place as the body image 
requires a pre-existing body that is identifiable in its own right. Here again, then, Hansen’s 
departure from theorists such as Hayles is marked: for Hayles, the body schema would intersect 
with the body image according to her revised version of the semiotic square (see Hayles 1999: 
chapter ten), and thus remain within the realm of signification as such; for Hansen, the body 
image feeds back to construct novel points and means of access to the body schema, but does not 
challenge the latter’s ontological priority.   
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*** 
 If I have shown that Hansen only tells half of the story, his organismic construction of 
technological posthumanism nonetheless remains an important specification of embodiment. 
Thus, the important thing to note is how Hansen has shifted the mark: while he has successfully 
articulated embodiment from an operational perspective, it is not clear how the bounds of 
embodiment are delineated except from an anthropocentric perspective that is constructed 
linguistically. That is, Hansen succeeds in accounting for technology’s relation to the human 
sensorium, but in so doing sets aside the question of how this sensorium accrues an economy of 
meaning beyond simply maintaining its operational integrity.  
 With this in mind, I conclude this essay by considering the most explicitly political 
moment in Hansen’s œuvre to date, chapter three of Bodies in Code (titled ‘digitizing the 
racialized body, or the politics of common impropriety’), wherein Hansen argues that all humans 
are bound by a common impropriety that can be understood as a form of resistance to the 
reductive classification of people relative to categories of social visibility.
xxiv
  In particular, 
Hansen’s analysis of ‘Internet passing’
xxv
 is illustrative of the pure body-in-code: because online 
self-invention yields an identity that is ‘an imitation of an imitation [i.e. an imitation of culturally 
sanctioned signifiers]’ these identities are ‘purely disembodied simulacr[a]’ (Hansen 2006a: 
146). Precisely because of this status, Hansen argues that (for example) in the case of 
racialization ‘a certain indetermination in the correlation between racialization and the image [is 
introduced, suspending] the “overdetermination” of the black body “from without” and thereby 
position[ing] the image as a static fixation of individuation’ (2006a: 157). In short, Internet 
passing catalyzes an experience of failed interpellation, of an incongruity with oneself that is 
definitive of affectivity (that is, of primary embodiment as the grounding space, or ‘spacing,’ of 
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perception).  Thus, as Jennifer Gonzalez notes, Hansen presents a pedagogical vision of 
cyberspace wherein the transcendence of visibility teaches those who are engaged in online 
passing the ‘bankruptcy of categories of identity’ (Gonzalez 2009: 40).  
 The political dimension of Hansen’s reading of the digital thus obtains in the fact that 
‘online interpellation submits everyone […] to the condition of having to pass; the generalization 
of the condition means in effect that the resulting abjection of the lived body from the space of 
intelligibility (visibility) can no longer be limited to certain subjects, but rather becomes a 
problem for all’ (Hansen 2006a: 147). And this, Hansen argues, points to the shortcomings of 
existing theories of interpellation: in Butler, for example, performative practices ‘function by 
making the bodily residue [or representation] culturally intelligible’ (Hansen 2006a: 146) and 
thereby build the radicality of embodiment into the scene of interpellation and thus deny it any 
standing outside the interpellative act. By contrast, the shared experience of Internet passing 
means that  
we all must live the erasure of our lived bodies, [so that] what is most significant about the transcendence of 
visibility in online interpellation is less the possibility it affords for new modes of represented agency than its 
exposure of the violence exerted on bodily life by generic categories of social intelligibility and by the politics 
of recognition—identity politics—that it subtends. (2006a: 147) 
In short, Internet passing does not so much open new avenues for self-expression, but rather re-
articulates the bodily constraints that condition such expression in the first place. 
 Clearly, Hansen’s analysis of Internet passing re-stages his argument against ‘linguistic 
reduction’ in a political dimension. Here again, then, it merits note that the meaning that Hansen 
ascribes to this politics remains contingent on the (representational) process of meaning-
formation that he seeks to subjugate. However, we (like Hansen) can further specify this 
objection in its political aspect by considering his assertion that the digital makes intelligibility ‘a 
problem for all.’ Bypassing the obvious objection that would insist that, in fact, access to the 
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Internet is not uniform or ubiquitous but is instead subject to its own complex social 
economy,
xxvi
 we might ask what the term ‘problem’ means in this instance. That is, why does the 
body require this linguistic intelligibility such that it constitutes a problematic in the first place? 
In fact, given Hansen’s larger project of freeing embodiment from linguistic interpretation, it 
would seem that just the opposite would be desirable in a bodily economy: to the extent that 
bodily specificity is reduced by technesis, it is not clear why this entrance into discourse—the 
condition of intelligibility—is politically desirable. That is, what mechanism (other than 
language) allows bodily concerns to migrate from the level of a techno-biological organism to 
that of a political organism without abstracting the contents of these strata into the logic of the 
body? In short, if an operational perspective constructs an organism in relation to its 
environment, how is the material specificity of that environment registered in its own right (i.e. 
as an extra-linguistic radical exteriority) while simultaneously being related to its constitutive 
organisms in their own right? That is, how do we register the material specificity of 
performativity, since it is clear that ‘not all forms of performance are equal, nor do they have 
equal effects’ (Gonzalez 2009: 40). In the context of grammatology, this paradox is recognized 
to be constitutively irresolvable, and is acknowledged through the (hyper)mediating role afforded 
arche-writing. If Hansen shifts the site of this mediating role to the practices of bodies, though, it 
is not clear how inter-subjective and inter-strata political agencies can take hold without 
abstracting bodies into a discourse that (according to Hansen) does not register their specificity. 
 Further, we can conclude that the embodied excess to social intelligibility that Hansen 
explicates robs that intelligibility of that which makes it, literally, desirable. That is, if the 
conventional engine of interpellation is desire (which is predicated on a fundamental and radical 
lack that is articulated in and as the linguistic dimension), then the politics of Hansen’s 
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construction of posthumanism comes to its crux: on one hand, Hansen cannot follow Deleuze 
and Guattari (for example) in re-figuring desire as a line of flight that attaches to real objects, 
because this would preclude the techno-biological constraints that ground affectivity and that 
motivated his intervention in the first place; on the other hand, Hansen cannot maintain these 
constraints without invoking a notion of desire predicated on a lack that is linguistically inscribed 
by the Law. In the absence of either perspective, it remains unclear how political agency can 
come to be registered as a problem in the first place. 
 Thus, the politics of Hansen’s organismic construction of technological posthumanism do 
not spring from the primordial subjectivity that he claims, but rather from the claiming itself: in 
the case of political agency, Hansen’s writing performs the wrangling that has come to 
characterize the relation between the discourses of desire alluded to above. Indeed, this points to 
a broader observation about Hansen’s understanding of affectivity, one that points back to the 
problem that this essay (and Hansen’s theoretical œuvre) started with: in figuring a pre-
discursive body, Hansen in fact figures the discursive rent between technologists and cultural 
theorists that he seeks to address: precisely because he fails to take the discourse of technology 
beyond the pale of linguistic analysis, Hansen succeeds in articulating the necessity of continuing 
to think deconstruction in its most radical dimensions.
xxvii
 That is, the rifts opened by Hansen’s 
insistence on the primacy of affectivity remind us that the categories that language produces 
(such as race and gender, in the case of Internet passing) cannot simply be ‘moved beyond,’ 
because they are not properties of individuals but rather ‘relations of public encounter’ 
(Gonzalez 2009: 56). In this, a paradox takes hold: precisely because theoretical concerns do, 
necessarily, subjugate practical ones with respect to generating a meaningful understanding of 
posthumanity, they themselves are also subjugated by a profound co-implication of practice and 
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research that precludes the possibility of either practice or theory keeping what it wins from the 
other. This paradox is that of deconstruction, and is precisely what is foreclosed by the 
misreading of Derrida that allows Hansen to clear the ground he then claims. By showing the 
ambivalence that grounds Hansen’s thought, then, I hope to reveal the ‘leaps of faith’ into 
sensibility that redouble linguistic contingency under the auspices of eliminating it.  
 But what, in closing, does attending to the radicality of this position mean? With respect 
to the question of human-technology relations, it suggests that efforts to articulate posthumanism 
as an overcoming of deconstruction are doomed both to reify deconstruction as an opposition to 
embodiment and to recapitulate the very errors that have been patiently unearthed by 
deconstructive approaches at least since the publication of Grammatology. More generally, this 
challenge entails accepting the final undecidability of any signifying instance, so that there is a 
very real sense in which the question cannot be answered coherently. And yet, the challenge that 
this question implies—a demand to act responsibly, in the full sense of the term—is nonetheless 
convincingly met precisely because the question remains unanswerable, in the sense that it 
constructs posthumanism in a way that refuses the sedimentation of a unified discourse.  
 
                                                
i
 ‘Posthumanism’ is different than ‘transhumanism’: transhumanism advocates a narrative of 
technological progressivism predicated on extending the capacities of human bodies; 
posthumanism, by contrast, is a much more variegated—and contested—discourse, tending to 
focus on the problematic of human/non-human relations. The ‘post’ of posthumanism as it is 
used here, then, names both a contemporary historical moment in which technical, medial, 
informatic and economic networks make it increasingly impossible to ignore Foucault’s 
observation that ‘humanism is its own dogma’ (Wolfe 2010: xiv), as well as an anteriority that is 
the ‘embodiment and embeddedness of the human being’ in biological and technical worlds 
(Wolfe 2010: xv). 
ii
 Hansen’s work has garnered significant and sustained attention since the publication of New 
Philosophy for New Media, particularly in the North American vein of Media Studies and in 
emerging discourses of posthumanism. Compelling in its own right, Hansen’s work is also a 
valuable site of inquiry because it combines frequently cited theories of affect and systems 
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theory, each of which have been highly influential in discourses of posthumanism (as well as in 
the parent disciplines that posthumanism draws upon).  
iii
 Hansen uses ‘translation’ in Latour’s sense, as delineated in (Latour 1987: 132-144). 
iv
 In this essay, I use the term representation in the broad sense indicated by Hansen, where he 
notes that ‘by representationalist approach [he means] any approach that legitimizes 
representation as its frame of reference, whether for ends either affirmative or critical, positivist 
or deconstructive’ (Hansen 2000: 4)  
v
 For example, Hansen argues that systems theory functions ‘by bracketing out all constraint the 
real might impose [on a system]’ (2000: 80) such that materiality ‘receives a purely abstract 
determination as that which resists translation per se’ (2000: 79). Similarly, he accuses cultural 
studies of being ‘restricted to the effects [technology] has on our capacity […] to represent 
ourselves to ourselves, […so that] whatever exteriority is thereby broached [can only be a] point 
of resistance internal to the representational space of thought’ (2000: 78). 
vi
 To be clear, the Derridean claim is not that all technical apparatuses partake of language’s 
instability and ambiguity, but rather that our knowledge of them does (and that they come to be, 
for us, only through becoming objects of knowledge). However, the inverse is also true in that 
Derridean claims about language are predicated on language’s not being understood as a system 
that is closed off from the operations of technics. Thus, the issue is not whether biological 
processes can operate independent of language, but rather that extrapolating these processes into 
an observational register (or a predictive or categorical one, for that matter) in order to delve into 
their meaning is not a neutral endeavour: understanding digestion as a digestive process, rather 
than as a random or even stochastic set of events, necessarily presumes a frame of reference (i.e. 
an individual, or a part of an individual) that is privileged linguistically.  
vii
 Further to this, Bourdieu notes that ‘what is “learned by the body” is not something that one 
has, like knowledge that can be brandished, but something that one is’ (cited in Hansen 2000: 
51). 
viii
 Hansen gestures towards this question in his detailed consideration of Merleau-Ponty’s écart, 
through which Merleau-Ponty describes the flesh as the ‘intertwining [and reversibility] of the 
sensate and the sensible […that] directly problematizes the concept of intentionality’ (Flynn 
2008). However, Hansen maintains that, because the écart occupies the ‘cusp between the 
biological and the psychic prior to their actual differentiation’ (Hansen 2006a: 61), embodied 
alterity is ‘a primary condition of the being of the body’ (2006a: 74). In short, Hansen folds 
Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the flesh into his own concept of the primordial body. 
ix
 Jennifer Gonzalez notes that Hansen turns to Agamben ‘to argue for digital media’s potential 
to produce the conditions for the emergence of an identityless, subjectless singularity’ (Gonzalez 
2009: 47-48). 
x
 My account of the literal material of skulls draws heavily from Hansen’s description; see 
(Hansen 2004: 196-205). 
xi
 ‘Rapid-prototyping’ describes a process wherein digitally produced image-models are rendered 
as physical objects. Variations of the technology are frequently used in manufacturing to quickly 
produce physical prototypes of computer-generated blueprints, where the latter are often drawn 
in computer aided design (CAD) programs such as QCad, ArchiCAD, and AutoCAD.  
xii
 Sound is un-scored and site-specific, and has been adapted and re-appropriated for various 
instruments and settings. In every iteration, the compositional emphasis is on achieving the 
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‘pataphysical quality discussed below, rather than on acting a prescribed aesthetic or formal 
program.  
xiii
 These listener accounts are (admittedly) anecdotal, and were not collected via any particular 
methodology. However, I would argue that this shortcoming does not impact the argument at 
hand: since Sound is discussed here in its conceptual—rather than aural—particularity, any 
reader who doubts the veracity of this account is welcome to take the discussion in the spirit of a 
‘thought-experiment’ (i.e. ‘if one were to be able to stage a piece that accomplished what is 
claimed for Sound, what would this mean?’). 
xiv
 For example, a listener who attests to hearing a low-shelf filter is saying that they hear a 
preponderance of frequencies that are higher than a certain pitch. The observation is correct, 
even if the reason attributed to it is not. 
xv
 'Pataphysics is a term coined by the French writer Alfred Jarry that means, roughly, ‘the 
science of imaginary solutions.’ The inclusion of the apostrophe at the beginning of the word 
‘was mandated by Jarry to avoid physical puns, [including] 'patte à physique' (leg of physics)’ 
(Hiebert 2008: 121). As it is used here, the term also relates to Ted Hiebert's extrapolation of 
Jarry via the notion of 'pataperception, which ‘might be defined as “the observation of imaginary 
appearances”‘ (Hiebert 2008: 121).  
xvi
 That is, the seemingly unbounded possibilities of live electronics obsolesce illusion, in the 
sense that they perform a claim to technical overcoming in place of the conventional sleight of 
hand that is implied in an acoustic setting. 
xvii
 ‘EQ’ (short for equalization) refers to frequency-specific amplitude modulation, allowing the 
listener to emphasize the treble, mid, or bass ranges of a sound. ‘MaxMSP’ is a visual 
programming language that is commonly used for audio processing (though it also includes 
multimedia functionality), and includes EQ as a very small and basic part of its robust 
capabilities. The software is designed to be highly modular, with most programs (or ‘patches’) 
made by arranging and connecting ‘objects’ (which each have a specific function) within a two-
dimensional visual canvas. An explanatory video is available from the Cycling ‘74 website at 
http://cycling74.com/products/maxmspjitter/ 
xviii
 Or rather, the body is both externalized and not; Sound emphasizes the latter—which is the 
sense in which the latter takes place—but it nonetheless remains in tension with the former (vis à 
vis the discussion of deconstruction offered above).  
xix
 Importantly, this would be the case even without the computer technologies being present on 
stage, as the same logic applies to both the physical piano and the practical and conceptual 
architecture that binds the piece (i.e. that coalesces it as a unified object of study). In Sound, 
then, this process is simply desublimated. 
xx
 As suggested above and re-iterated below, this perspective’s departure from Hansen is subtle, 
and occurs via the degree of strength accorded the deconstructive ‘always-already.’ For Hansen, 
this ‘always-already’ is a soft claim that pertains to representation only, rather than to the real as 
such.   
xxi
 This opposition between Hayles and Hansen is amplified by being described, and is not 
intended to wholly contain the relation between the two. Instead, I am simply gesturing towards 
the implications of Hansen’s insistence on the body’s pre-discursive (as opposed to extra-
discursive) status. 
xxii
 This rendering of embodiment is implicitly underwritten by a cognitive theory of conceptual 
integration called ‘double-scope blending.’ In essence, this theory argues that humans are the 
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only species capable of thinking and feeling beyond the scale of their biological configuration, 
and that this is accomplished through the ability to use our human scale as a scaffold (‘a 
cognitively congenial basis’) from which to reach out, manage, manipulate, transform, develop, 
and handle vast conceptual networks. ‘These new human-scale blends become second nature for 
us, and blending is recursive: packed, human-scale blends become inputs to new networks [so 
that] what was once beyond human scale is now packed to human scale’ (Turner 2009). In this 
way, double-scope blending suggests that ‘basic structures already present in our sensory-motor 
processing can be recruited for abstract thought without presupposing separate systems allegedly 
unrelated to our bodily engagement with our environment’(Johnson 2009). In short, we are 
organismically configured to produce representations, but these representations remain grounded 
in our operations as a biological organism. It bears noting that double-scope blending has faced 
significant criticism: the ‘problem’ of how we integrate alternate scales can only be framed as 
such through a prior disarticulation of our cognition from our biology. If this is the case, though, 
then it would imply an emergence of cultural bodies—bodies whose reproduction takes place via 
a-genetic means—that, in turn, deconstructs the biological primacy that double-scope blending 
assumes. 
xxiii
 This insistence points to a separate line of argument—most notably in New Philosophy for 
New Media—wherein Hansen takes issue with Deleuze’s reading of the image in Bergson.  
xxiv
 The following discussion, admittedly, raises more issues than an essay of this scope can 
adequately address. I include it in order to emphasize the tangible ramifications for the critique 
of Hansen that I have mounted, and to highlight the extent to which narrations of human-
technology coupling are complexly entangled with what the coupling yields.    
xxv
 ‘Internet passing’ consists in passing oneself off as something/someone other than oneself on-
line. For example, a man may ‘pass himself’ as a woman in an Internet chat-room.  
xxvi
 Not only is the Internet not universally accessible, but when it is accessed it is not done so 
through uniform technological constraints, and this heterogeneity does not always parallel socio-
economic striations. Simply put, the materiality of the Internet has its own historical 
specifications, so that Jodi Dean has argued that ‘while the Internet may indeed provide one site 
for democratic politics, it does not constitute a public sphere (particularly in the Habermasian 
sense of equal access and homogeneous participation)’ (summarized in Gonzalez 2009: 60).  
xxvii
 In addition to the brief explication offered below, this challenge is also one of comportment. 
That is, if I have taken some pains to insist that Hansen hasn’t simply misread Derrida but 
actually performs the ambivalence that deconstruction diagnoses, this is partially in order to 
buttress my argument against the notion that I am trying to execute a conservative gesture of 
‘taking Hansen back to Derrida.’ To think deconstruction in its full radicality would involve, 
equally, a sense of deconstruction moving forward through Hansen; the renewed urgency that 
Hansen lends the discourse is, after all, no small matter when one acknowledges that Derridean 
deconstruction—like any discourse—morphs, coalesces, accelerates, and slows according to 
forces in addition to those of reason.    
 0 
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